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1 Introduction
Unemployment rates are typically higher in Europe than in the US although job turnover
rates are roughly similar on either side of the Atlantic, but acyclical or procyclical in Europe
and countercyclical in the US (see OECD, 1994). A recent number of empirical papers sug-
gest that the divergent pattern of European and US unemployment rates may be related to
institutional differences by generating distinct responses to similar macroeconomic shocks
(see for instance Nickell, 1997, Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, or Bertola et al., 2001). The
institutional parameters emphasized by these studies as most important for aggregate em-
ployment are the generosity of the unemployment insurance system and the wage setting
process whereas employment protection measures have no clear effect. Ljungqvist and Sar-
gent (2002), in a general equilibrium search model, put forward the role of higher firing costs
and more generous unemployment benefits to explain the weak performance of European
labor market in face of higher economic turbulence. Den Haan et al. (2001) emphasize the
effects of TFP growth, real interest rate and taxes rather than economic turbulences.
Less work has however been devoted to analyze how to explain both the similarity in job
turnover rates and the differences in unemployment rates, between Europe and the US. It is
now well known that job protection alone cannot explain these features since it unambigu-
ously reduces both the job creation rate and the job destruction rate and has an ambiguous
effect on the unemployment rate (see Ljungqvist, 2002). Bertola and Rogerson (1997) ar-
gue however that wage-compression and dismissal restrictions have opposite effects on job
turnover and that their interaction could account for the similarity of job turnover rates
in countries where these institutional regulations differ. More recently, Cahuc and Zylber-
berg (1999) investigate the interaction between job protection and minimum wage. They
start from the standard search and matching Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model where,
with freely negotiated wages, firing taxes have a positive impact on employment. They show
that this conclusion can be reversed when wage negotiations are constrained by a minimum
wage rule.
A still less clarified question is how to explain the differences in the cyclical properties of job
flows on European and US labor markets. Garibaldi (1998) analyses the effect of employ-
ment protection legislation and shows that introducing firing permissions has a substantial
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effect on the dynamic behavior of job flows, despite a negligible impact on equilibrium un-
employment. A decrease in the arrival rate of firing permissions lowers the relative volatility
of the job destruction rate, so that the job turnover becomes less and less countercyclical.
In Garibaldi’s model, wages are set by the firms at the workers exogenous reservation utility
and consequently do not depend on the business cycle.
Our objective is to build on these previous works and look more closely at the combined
effects of unemployment benefits, employment protection and wage rigidities. We construct
for that purpose a stochastic intertemporal general equilibrium model with search unemploy-
ment and endogenous job turnover. We examine the effects of these institutional variables,
on both the stationary state values of unemployment and job flows and on their cyclical
properties. Our starting point is den Haan et al. (2000), who insert the Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) model into an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, with endoge-
nous interest rates and capital accumulation. One can in this way capture the interactions
between capital accumulation and job destruction. We then extend their analysis by intro-
ducing the three above-mentioned labor market institutions. Unemployment benefits are
exogenous and employment protection takes the form of a firing tax. The downward wage
rigidity is modelled as a ”minimum wage” constraint, i.e. as a lower bound on the outcome
of wage negotiations: wages are renegotiated ”at will” according to a Nash bargaining rule
as long as they remain above this institutionally determined lower bound1.
We calibrate the model so as to reproduce the main characteristics of an ”average” EU
economy, and show that unemployment benefits have a sizeable effect on the unemployment
rate, not so much though as the wage rigidity. As in Cahuc and Zylberberg (1999), the effect
of employment protection depends on the level of the minimum wage. When the minimum
wage is low (resp. high), a firing tax has a positive (resp. negative) effect on equilibrium
employment. These effects remain quantitatively limited though. We extend this analysis
to the cyclical properties of job flows. Unemployment benefits and especially wage rigidities
are shown to have a positive effect on the job turnover procyclicality. Our main result is that
1Wage rigidities may take much more subtle forms and be much more pervasive than ”minimum wage”
restrictions (see Cahuc and Zylberberg (1999) for a more elaborated representation of downward wage
rigidities). We will refer throughout the paper to the lower bound of the wage distribution as to the
”minimum wage”, keeping in mind that it is not associated with the worker’s productivity. Indeed, all
individuals in our model have the same skills; different jobs may however have different productivities.
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the direction and size of the effects of employment protection on job flow dynamics depend
on the degree of wage rigidity. With high wage rigidities, firing costs have a negative impact
on the relative job destruction rate volatility (with respect to the job creation rate volatility)
and increase the procyclicality of the job turnover rate. These results are compatible with
Garibaldi (1998). We show however that the results are reversed in the case of flexible wages.
It is thus the minimum wage, and its interaction with the firing costs (rather than the firing
cost alone), that seems to matter to explain the differences between the cyclical properties
of US and EU labor markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we summarize some key
empirical findings about the working of labor market in OECD countries, and report some
estimates of the relative importance of unemployment benefits, job protection and wage
rigidities. In section 3, we present our theoretical framework. The model is then calibrated
in section 4 and simulated in section 5 to provide a quantitative assessment of the effects of
our institutional variables on the steady state and the cyclical properties of our economy.
The last section concludes.
2 Labor market flows and institutions: some stylized
facts
2.1 Job turnover and unemployment
An important feature regarding job flows dynamics is that, in most OECD countries, the job
turnover rate (JT ) is relatively high, between 15% and 25% (see second column of table 1).
This observation is more striking if we consider the third column of table 1, which provides
the net employment change rate (NET ), defined simply as the difference between the job
creation rate (JC) and the job destruction rate (JD)2. Slightly positive net employment
changes are associated with very large job reallocations. If a high average level of job
turnover is a common feature of most OECD countries, we nevertheless observe differences
across countries in the job turnover cyclical properties. Looking at the fourth and fifth
columns, we notice that in the US, the JD rate is more volatile than the JC rate. On the
2See OECD (1994) for extensive definitions of these concepts.
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other hand, in the EU, the volatilities of the JD rate and the JC rate are quite similar (see
column 6).
Another well known empirical finding is that, generally, job creation is procyclical while
job destruction is countercyclical. It indeed seems intuitive enough to have more (resp.
less) job creations and less (resp. more) job destructions during economic expansion (resp.
recession). A much more open and debated question concerns the cyclicality of job turnover.
The OECD (1994) proposes a summary of relevant studies and it appears that in the US,
the job turnover is negatively correlated with the net employment change rate, whereas in
the EU, the correlation seems to be much less negative3 (see column 7). Consequently, in
the US, the level of job reallocation is higher during a recession, while in the EU, it is quite
constant over the cycle. Finally, as displayed in the last column of table 1, the unemployment
rate is lower in the US than in the EU.
[INSERT TABLE 1]
2.2 Labor market institutions
Using different unemployment durations (from 1 to 5 years) and different marital status
(single, couple without children, couple with two children), the OECD (2002) computes a
synthetical net replacement ratio for 1999. This statistics (second column of table 2) is twice
higher in most EU countries4 than in the US. This stresses the relative generosity of unem-
ployment benefits in EU countries (relatively to the US). The OECD (1999) also computes a
synthetical index of the strictness of the employment protection legislation in the late 1990’s.
This indicator (first figure of the third column) includes regular and temporary contracts
and takes into account the regular procedural inconveniences, the notice and severance pay
for no-fault individual dismissals and the difficulty of dismissal. A low (resp. high) index
means a low (resp. high) protection of employment. The OECD also ranks the 26 countries
surveyed by order of increasing employment protection legislation. This ranking is given
between parentheses in the third column. We again observe a sharp difference between the
EU (strong employment protection) and the US (almost no employment protection). The
3NET is taken as a measure of the cycle in empirical papers. Data are also HP filtered.
4The replacement ratio in Italy is quite low and even lower than in the US. This ratio however rapidly
increases over time.
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fourth column of table 2 reproduces the gross Kaitz index given by the OECD (1998) for the
year 1997. The Kaitz index is here defined as the ratio between the minimum wage and the
gross full-time mean earnings. This Kaitz index is over 0.50 for the EU countries whereas
it is only 0.35 for the US. The ratio between the highest and the lowest wages provides an
alternative measure of wage dispersion. The last column of table 2 gives the D9/D1 ratio5
(see OECD, 1996). The obvious conclusion is that the wage dispersion is substantially lower
in EU countries. This may be the result of downward wage rigidities induced by minimum
wage legislation, collective agreements negotiated by more powerful trade unions, etc.
[INSERT TABLE 2]
3 Model
We construct a two-tier productive structure by assuming the coexistence of three types of
agents in the economy: intermediate firms, a representative final firm and a representative
household6. Intermediate firms require one worker to produce x units of intermediate good.
As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), x is a random job-specific productivity parameter
drawn each period from a general cdf F 7. The final firm uses intermediate goods as well
as capital to produce an homogeneous final good that can be either consumed or invested
by the household. This representative household supplies labor to intermediate firms and
capital to the final firm. We then have three types of markets for respectively labor, goods
and capital.
5D1 and D9 refer to the upper earnings limits of, respectively, the first and the ninth deciles of employees
ranked in order of their gross earning from lowest to highest.
6We could assume, as in den Haan et al. (2000), a ”one-tier” productive structure with only single job
firms with labor but also capital as input. Our two-tier structure however allows a simpler presentation.
7The assumption that the idiosyncratic shock arrival rate is equal to 1 (as for instance in den Haan et
al., 2000) greatly simplifies our model. Introducing some persistence for these shocks would indeed necessi-
tate to use a discrete aggregate productivity shock (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, or Garibaldi, 1998,
for such aggregate productivity shock) rather than the usual specification used in RBC models (see equa-
tion (31)).
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3.1 Labor market flows
We assume that the total labor force is constant and normalized to 1, with Nt employed
workers and Ut unemployed workers:
1 = Nt + Ut. (1)
At each period, the number Mt of new employer-worker contacts is function of the stock
Vt of vacancies and of the number of efficient job seekers, i.e. the number of unemployed
weighted by a function S of their search effort St. More formally:
Mt =M (Vt,S(St)Ut) , (2)
where the matching function M is increasing, concave in its arguments and M(0, .) =
M(., 0) = 0. The function S is increasing, concave and 0 ≤ St. The probability for a firm
with a vacancy to meet a job seeker is qt and the probability for a job seeker to meet a
vacancy is pt, and they are respectively given by:
qt =
Mt
Vt
and pt =
Mt
S(St)Ut
. (3)
All contacts will not lead to job creation because some matches may turn out not to be
productive enough. The productivity x of a new match is only revealed after the contact
and may be too low to generate a positive surplus. The endogenous destruction rate of the
new contacts will be denoted χ0t , whereas the endogenous destruction rate of existing jobs
is χ1t . The difference between these two rates arises from the fact that new contacts are not
covered by an employment protection, conversely to the existing jobs8. Total employment is
the sum over two different types of jobs: ”new jobs” (new contacts not destroyed) denoted by
the superscript j = 0 and ”old jobs” (existing jobs not destroyed) denoted by the superscript
j = 1. The dynamics of total employment, in term of job seekers’ search effort, is given by:
Nt+1 = N
0
t+1 +N
1
t+1 = (1− χ
0
t+1)ptS(St)Ut + (1− χ
1
t+1)Nt. (4)
8Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) assume that a new job always starts at the highest available productivity
and is therefore never severed during the first period. As pointed by Caballero and Hammour (1996), this
assumption is particularly suitable for growth models with creative destruction.
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3.2 Intermediate firms
A new contact at time t will lead to job creation at time t + 1 if hit by an idiosyncratic
productivity shock higher both than the reservation productivity RF,0t+1 for the intermediate
firm andRH,0t+1 for the household. The reservation productivity for a new job is therefore given
by R0t+1 = max{R
F,0
t+1, R
H,0
t+1} and the asset value of an intermediate firm with a vacancy,
WVt , is:
WVt = −a+ (1− qt)β˜tEt
[
WVt+1
]
+
qtβ˜tEt
[
F (R0t+1)W
V
t+1 +
∫ +∞
R0
t+1
W
F,0
t+1(z)dF (z)
]
.
(5)
a is the cost of opening a vacancy, firms discount expected future profits by β˜t (defined in the
next section), and WF,0t is the asset value of a new job. The asset value of an intermediate
firm with a job of type j ∈ {0, 1} and with a productivity x is:
W
F,j
t (x) = xdt − w
j
t (x)+
β˜tEt
[
F (R1t+1)(W
V
t+1 − f) +
∫ +∞
R1
t+1
W
F,1
t+1(z)dF (z)
]
.
(6)
dt is the unit price of the intermediate goods, f the firing tax, R
1
t the reservation productivity
for an old job (R1t+1 = max{R
F,1
t+1, R
H,1
t+1}) and w
j
t (x) the wage. For the moment, we suppose
a completely general wage formation mechanism wjt : < → < : x w
j
t (x). The reservation
productivity RF,0t for a firm with a new contact is determined by:
W
F,0
t (R
F,0
t ) = 0. (7)
The firms with an old job have to pay a firing tax if the match is severed and their reservation
productivity RF,1t is therefore determined by:
W
F,1
t (R
F,1
t ) + f = 0. (8)
Finally, by the free entry condition, we also have:
WVt = 0. (9)
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3.3 Household
The representative household’s welfare satisfies the following Bellmann equation9:
WHt = max
Ct,St
{
U(Ct)−D
S(St)Ut −D
N (Nt) + βEt
[
WHt+1
]}
, (10)
where Ct is consumption, U is an increasing and concave utility function, D
S and DN are
increasing and convex disutility functions (respectively of search and work) and β is the
subjective discount parameter. Defining the average wage for a job of type j by:
w¯
j
t =
∫ +∞
Rjt
w
j
t (z)dF (z)
1− F (Rjt )
, (11)
the household’s budget constraint then writes:
Ct = Πt + w
uUt + w¯
0
tN
0
t + w¯
1
tN
1
t + (rt + δ)Kt − (Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt)− Tt. (12)
The profits redistributed by the intermediate firms (value added net of labor, firing and
vacancy costs) are represented by Πt, w
u stands for the unemployment benefit, Kt is the
capital stock, δ its depreciation rate and Tt is a lump sum tax levied to finance the unem-
ployment insurance. The optimization equation (10) is subject to the budget constraint (12)
and equation (4)10.
For the household, the reservation productivity RH,jt for a job of type j is determined by:
WH
Njt
(RH,jt ) = 0, (13)
where WH
Njt
is the marginal contribution to household’s welfare of working on a job of type
j. The job destruction rate χjt for a job of type j is F (R
j
t ). Moreover, the firms are owned
by the household and the rate at which future profits should be discounted is given by:
β˜t = βEt
[
UCt+1
UCt
]
. (14)
3.4 Final firm
The asset value of the representative final firm satisfies the following Bellmann equation:
Wt = max
Qt,Kt+1
{
F(Kt, Qt)− (rt + δ)Kt −Qtdt + β˜tEt [Wt+1]
}
, (15)
9As usual in most of the related literature, we assume a perfect insurance mechanism between the members
of the household.
10The optimality conditions are detailed in the annex.
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where F is an increasing and concave in its arguments production function which moreover
satisfies F(0, .) = F(., 0) = 0, and Qt is the quantity of intermediate goods
11. Intermediate
goods supplied by intermediate firms with a job of type j is:
Q
j
t =
∫ +∞
Rjt
zdF (z)
1− F (Rjt )
N
j
t , (16)
and the total amount of intermediate goods is simply Qt = Q
0
t +Q
1
t .
3.5 Wage determination
We assume that, at each period, wages are (re)negotiated between the firms and the repre-
sentative household. These bargained wages can be determined by a fairly standard Nash
product problem. The wage wb,0t (x) for new workers, not protected by a firing tax, is the
solution of:
max
wb,0t (x)
(
W
F,0
t (x)−W
V
t
)1−η (WHN0t (x)
UCt
)η
, (17)
while the wage wb,1t (x) for old workers is the solution of:
max
wb,1t (x)
(
W
F,1
t (x) −W
V
t + f
)1−η (WHN1t (x)
UCt
)η
. (18)
In both equations, η represents the household’s bargaining power12. Using equations (5)
to (9), equations (10) to (13) and the definition of Rjt , bargained wages can be rewritten in
the general form:
w
b,j
t (x) = η(x−R
j
t )dt + w
b,j
t (R
j
t ). (19)
We model wage rigidities by assuming that negotiated wages cannot fall below a lower bound
wm. The critical productivity value Qjt for which there is equality between the lower bound
wm and the freely bargained wage wb,jt (x) is defined by:
w
b,j
t (Q
j
t ) = w
m. (20)
As a result, wages can be written as:
w
j
t (x) =

 w
m if x ≤ Qjt ,
w
b,j
t (x) if x > Q
j
t ,
(21)
11See the annex for the optimality conditions.
12In these equations, the firm asset value is expressed in final good unit while the representative household’s
welfare is in utility unit. As for instance in Mertz (1995), we therefore divide the household’s marginal welfare
by the marginal utility of consumption, to normalize.
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and the bargained wage equation (19) can be rewritten as:
w
b,j
t (x) = η(x−Q
j
t )dt + w
m. (22)
This equation shows that the lower bound wm has a direct positive effect on bargained
wages, but also an indirect negative effect via an increase in the critical value Qjt . It is easy
to check that without a wage rigidity, i.e. when wm is not binding, the decision to stop
a match is jointly taken by the firm and the household; while if some wages are bounded
downwards, the decision to stop a match is always taken by the firm13.
4 Calibration
The calibration is based on quarterly data, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). The
calibration is chosen to reproduce the stylized facts presented in section 2 for EU labor
markets. The numerical values of the calibrated parameters are reported in table 3.
[INSERT TABLE 3]
We use the following specific functions:
F(K,Q) = ε¯ (K)µ(Q)1−µ, (23)
U(C) = ln(C), (24)
M(V,S(S)U) = m¯ (V )λ(S(S)U)1−λ, (25)
S(S) = σ1
Sσ2
σ2
, (26)
DS(S) = φS1
Sφ
S
2
φS2
and DN (N) = φN1
Nφ
N
2
φN2
. (27)
The depreciation rate δ of capital is set at 2.5% while the psychological discount factor
β is 0.99, implying an annual interest rate of 4%. The aggregate productivity shock ε¯ is
normalized to 1; µ = 0.33 yields a capital-output ratio around 9. Empirical estimates of
the elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment are in the range of 0.5-0.7 for EU
countries (see for instance Pissarides and Petrongolo, 2001). We choose an intermediate
value 1− λ = 0.6. The household’s bargaining power is set equal to the workers’ parameter
13See the annex for additional properties.
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of the matching function, i.e. η = 1 − λ14. The cost of keeping a vacancy open is usually
estimated to be small. We fix a = 0.2 which implies an average recruiting cost equal to 7%
of the annual wage, a figure similar to Mortensen and Pissarides (1999).
Table 2 shows that the net replacement ratio is higher than 0.50 in most EU countries. This
ratio must nevertheless be seen as an upper bound since it does not account for eligibility
criteria and the effect of unemployment duration on benefit entitlements. In our model,
we fix the replacement ratio to 0.43 which gives an unemployment benefit wu = 0.44. The
cost arising from employment protection is also expected to be high in EU countries but
is more difficult to estimate. In our model, f is a firing tax which encompasses the cost
of administrative procedurals, of social protests, etc. We therefore follow Mortensen and
Pissarides (1999) who estimate this cost to be about three times as large as the cost of
keeping a vacancy open and we set f = 0.5015. Table 2 reports a gross Kaitz index above
0.50 in the EU countries. The net Kaitz index is therefore higher and we fix it to 0.58 in
our model leading to a minimum wage level wm = 0.6. This minimum wage implies that
14% of the employed workers are paid at the minimum wage (the OECD, 1998, reports for
instance a figure of 11% for France in 1996) and a D9/D1 ratio of 2.5, which seems realistic
enough.
Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), we assume that idiosyncratic shocks are uni-
formly distributed, so that: F (x) = x, ∀ x ∈ [0, 1]. It remains to determine the 7 following
parameters: m¯, σi and φ
j
i , with i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {S,N}. By simplicity, we assume a
quadratic (resp. linear) search (resp. work) disutility function and the slope parameters of
the search efficiency and the search disutility functions are set to 1. m¯, σ2 and φ
N
1 are finally
determined so as to recover particular steady state values for the unemployment rate, the
mean duration of the unemployment spell, and the job destruction rate. The chosen values
imply an unemployment rate of 10.5% (close to the value observed, see table 1); and an
average unemployment spell duration of 2.4 quarters. In their model calibrated on Europe,
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) use an average unemployment spell duration of 9 months,
instead of 3 months in their calibration on US data. As shown in section 2, the average
14See for instance Andolfatto (1996) and Mertz (1995) for a similar assumption. Their motivation is that
this so-called Hosios condition implies, in their simpler model, a competitive equilibrium of the decentralized
economy equivalent to the equilibrium of the social planner’s problem.
15We show in the annex that our results are still valid using different calibrations for f .
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annual job turnover is estimated to be in between 15% and 25% in EU countries. Taking
the mean value (20%) would imply an annual job destruction rate of 10%16 and therefore
a quarterly job destruction rate of 2.5%. This figure however underestimates the true job
destruction rate, because it does not take into account the jobs created and destroyed within
the year. We thus set the job destruction rate χ1 = 4%.
5 Simulations
In this section, we simulate our model and examine both steady state and dynamic prop-
erties. The focus is on the effects of labor market institutions on the unemployment rate
and on job flows. The unemployment rate Ut is defined by equation (1). Using a uniform
idiosyncratic shock distribution, the job destruction rate is given by JDt = R
1
t , while the
job creation rate JCt is:
JCt =
(1−R0t )Mt−1
Nt−1
. (28)
The job turnover JTt and the net employment change NETt are respectively the sum and
the difference between these two rates:
JTt = JCRt + JDRt, (29)
NETt = JCRt − JDRt =
Nt −Nt−1
Nt−1
. (30)
5.1 Steady state effects
We focus on this subsection on the long-run, steady state effects of changes in our three insti-
tutional parameters (the unemployment benefit wu, the lower bound wm for the bargained
wage and the firing tax f). The results are displayed in table 4 and figure 1.
[INSERT TABLE 4]
A 10% increase in the unemployment benefit reduces the household’s search effort, thereby
lengthening unemployment duration by 8.3%. This is in line with the result of Layard et
al. (1991) according to which the elasticity of the unemployment duration to the unem-
ployment benefit is estimated to be between 0.2 and 0.9. By strengthening the worker’s
16At the steady state, the job creation is equal to the job destruction.
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bargaining position, an increase in wu has a direct positive impact on bargained wages. The
destruction rate and the average wage increase, unemployment rises and output falls. We
hence recover empirical and theoretical results showing a negative relationship between the
unemployment benefit and the employment level.
A strengthening of the wage rigidities via a 10% increase in wm has a positive effect on the
job destruction rate and the fraction of workers paid at the minimum wage. The average
wage increases, employment and output decrease.
The effect of an increase in the firing tax is known to be ambiguous: it decreases the
job destruction rate, but also reduces job creation and increases unemployment duration.
This, in turn, negatively affects the bargaining position of the worker and leads to a lower
bargained wage. If wages are flexible (low wm), this wage effect is sufficient to ensure a
decrease in equilibrium unemployment. However, if wages are rigid (high wm), the decrease
in the bargained wage is no longer large enough and unemployment rises. We illustrate these
interactions between f and wm in figure 1. We reproduce the effects on the unemployment
rate of a 10% increase in the firing tax, for different levels of the minimum wage. As
in Cahuc and Zylberberg (1999), the effect is negative for low values of wm, whereas it
becomes positive for larger values. However, whatever the level of wm, the quantitative
effect of f on the unemployment rate is quite small.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
5.2 Cyclical properties
We now focus on the effects of institutions on the cyclical properties of job flows. We
introduce an autocorrelated aggregate productivity shock. In equation (23), ε¯ is replaced
by:
εt = ε¯
1−γε
γ
t−1e
ut , (31)
where γ is the coefficient of autocorrelation and ut is drawn from a normal distribution
N(0, σu). As in den Haan et al. (2000), we set γ = 0.95 and we calibrate σu = 0.03 in order
to have realistic volatilities for the job flows. We linearize our model, using a first order
14
Taylor expansion17, and we simulate it during 10000 periods. Table 5 displays the main
cyclical properties for the job flows18.
[INSERT TABLE 5]
The job flows are highly autocorrelated and, by calibration, their volatilities are similar
to those observed in table 1, although the relative job destruction volatility may be some-
what too high for a European economy. We also obtain the job creation rate procyclicality
(with respect to the net employment change) and the job destruction rate countercyclicality
observed in the data. The job turnover is more acyclical, as seems to be the case in EU
countries.
We vary our institutional parameters (±10%) and we evaluate their effects on the relative
volatility of the job destruction rate and on the procyclicality of the job turnover rate.
[INSERT TABLE 6]
As shown in table 6, unemployment benefit changes have almost no effects on the cyclical
properties of job flows. Changes in wage rigidities do however have substantial consequences.
More wage rigidities leads to a lower relative volatility of the job destruction rate and, con-
sequently, to a less countercyclical job turnover. The intuition is that, on the job destruction
side, only low productivity jobs, paid at the exogenous minimum wage, are destroyed; the
adjustments on this side of the labor market will thus be in quantities (job destruction rate)
rather than in prices (exogenous minimum wage). On the job creation side, most jobs will
be paid at a bargained wage, larger than the minimum wage, and the adjustments can go
through both wages and job creation. In this context, an increase in the minimum wage will
have little effect on the volatility of the job destruction rate, while on the job creation side,
it will reduce the proportion of bargained wages and thereby increase the volatility of the
job creation rate.
17We use the stochastic version of the software Dynare developed at CEPREMAP, Paris (see Juillard and
Collard, 1999). Our results are similar if we use a second order Taylor expansion.
18In the annex, we report the same simulations but with fixed capital. We show it does not alter our
qualitative results although flexible capital may magnify the effects of shocks. Moreover, we see that flexible
capital is important if we want to retain a reasonable value for consumption volatility.
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If an increase in the firing tax unambiguously reduces volatilities of job destruction and
job creation rates, its effect on the relative value of these two volatilities is however am-
biguous and depends on the level of the minimum wage (see figures 2 and 3). When wages
are flexible, aggregate productivity shocks are partly absorbed by wage changes. With a
minimum wage constraint, productivity shocks have larger effects on the job destruction
rate, whose volatility increases (see before). Firing taxes thus have a much larger impact
on the job destruction rate in a minimum wage economy, as it counteracts the effects of the
wage rigidity. As a result, an increase in f combined with flexible wages leads to a higher
relative job destruction volatility; while an increase in f combined with rigid wages leads
to a lower relative job destruction volatility. Using a model with completely rigid wages,
Garibaldi (1998) shows that increasing employment protection may explain the European
labor market cyclical properties. We find the same results but we extend them by showing
that these results are no more valid with flexible wages.
[INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3]
6 Conclusion
We construct a stochastic intertemporal general equilibrium model to study the role of
labor market institutions on the unemployment rate and on the cyclical properties of job
creation and job destruction flows. Not surprisingly, we obtain that unemployment benefits
and especially wage rigidities (taking the form of a lower bound on the negotiated wages),
are able to explain high unemployment rate. We also obtain, as other authors, that firing
taxes have small effects on the unemployment rate. The effects can be positive or negative
depending on the level of the minimum wage. These steady states results are in line with
recent empirical studies on labor market performances. Focusing on job flows, the model
suggests that their cyclical properties depend crucially on the level of the wage rigidity.
With a relatively high minimum wage, firing costs have a negative impact on volatility of
the job destruction rate (with respect to the job creation rate volatility) and makes the
job turnover rate less countercyclical. These effects are reversed if the minimum wage is
relatively low. The interaction between minimum wage and firing restrictions thus seems to
play a significant role in explaining the differences between EU and US labor markets.
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These results suggest that further developing the model to introduce more sophisticated
representations of wage rigidity and employment protection mechanisms is a worthwhile
research venue. Our representation of wage rigidities remains much too simple compared to
institutional features that characterize the wage setting process, in Europe. The specification
adopted in this paper remains tractable and could serve as a useful starting point for future
developments. Another way of improving this paper would be to take into account the
complex protection employment device that associates long term protected jobs and short
term unprotected jobs. As pointed out recently by Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), these
two policy instruments have conflicting effects on the job turnover rate and, according to
our results, are likely to interact with wage rigidities.
17
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Country JT NET σ(JC) σ(JD) σ(JD)/σ(JC) corr(JT, NET ) U
Belgium 15.2% 0.2% - - - - 11.2%
France 24.4% 0.9% 1.7 0.9 0.5 > 0 9.9%
Germany 16.5% 1.5% 0.8 0.8 1.0 ≈ 0 7.5%
Italy 21.0% 1.0% 1.2 0.9 0.7 ≈ 0 9.3%
Netherlands 15.4% 1.0% - - - - 7.7%
United States 18.6% 2.6% 2.0 3.0 1.5 < 0 6.8%
Yearly data. JT : job turnover, average 1984-1991 (may vary according to the country), source: OECD (1996),
table 5.1, p.163. NET : net employment change, average 1984-1991 (may vary according to the country), source:
OECD (1996), table 5.1, p.163. σ(JC): job creation standard deviation, average 1980’s (may vary according to
the country), HP filtered, source: Boeri (1996). σ(JD): job destruction standard deviation, average 1980’s (may
vary according to the country), HP filtered, source: Boeri (1996). corr(JT, NET ): summary from OECD (1994),
table 3.2, p.109. U : unemployment rate, average 1983-1993, source: OECD (1996), table 1.3, p.4.
Table 1: Job flows and unemployment: some empirical facts
Country Repl. ratio EPL strictness Kaitz index Wage dispersion
Belgium 0.70 2.1 (13) 0.53 2.2
France 0.52 3.0 (21) 0.55 3.3
Germany 0.63 2.5 (18) - 2.3
Italy 0.13 3.3 (23) - 2.8
Netherlands 0.76 2.1 (14) 0.51 2.6
United States 0.32 0.2 (1) 0.35 4.4
Repl. ratio: synthetical net replacement ratio, 1999, source: OECD (2002), table 3.10, p.41. EPL strictness:
synthetical index of the strictness of employment protection legislation and country ranking (between brackets),
late 1990’s, source: OECD (1999), table 2.5, p.66. Kaitz index: gross Kaitz index, mid-1997, source: OECD (1998),
table 2.3, p.37. Wage dispersion: gross D9/D1 ratio, 1995 (may vary according the country), source: OECD (1996),
table 3.1, p.62.
Table 2: Labor market institutions: some empirical facts
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Symbol Value Symbol Value
Matching function
m¯ 0.60 λ 0.4
Production function
ε¯ 1 µ 0.33
Search function
σ1 1 σ2 0.55
Disutility functions
φS1 1 φ
S
2 2
φN1 0.16 φ
N
2 1
Costs
a 0.20 f 0.50
Wages determination
η 0.60 wu 0.44
wm 0.60
Discount and depreciation
β 0.99 δ 0.025
Table 3: Numerical parameter values
F JT U pop wm U duration w¯
benchmark 1.43 9.8% 10.5% 14.5% 2.4 1.03
wu (+10%) -2.0% +2.1 +2.6 -1.0 +8.3% +0.5%
wm (+10%) -4.0% +6.8 +6.9 +4.6 +5.7% +1.6%
pop wm: percentage of the workers paid at the lower bound wage. U duration: mean unemployment spell duration
(expressed in quarters). w¯: mean wage.
Table 4: Long run effects of institutional shocks (deviations from the benchmark)
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Figure 1: Effect on unemployment of a firing tax 10% increase, for different values of wm
JCt JDt JTt
AR(1) 0.88 0.69 0.89
σ 0.82 1.00 1.50
corr(.,NETt) 0.46 -0.68 -0.21
All series are HP filtered. AR(1): autocorrelation of order 1. σ: standard deviation. corr(.,NETt): correlation
with respect to net employment change.
Table 5: Cyclical properties of job flows in reference calibration
wu = 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.48
σ(JDt)/σ(JCt) 1.22 1.21 1.22 1.21 1.21
corr(JTt, NETt) -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.20 -0.19
wm = 0.54 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.66
σ(JDt)/σ(JCt) 1.28 1.26 1.22 1.18 1.12
corr(JTt, NETt) -0.27 -0.24 -0.21 -0.16 -0.12
All series are HP filtered. σ: standard deviation. corr(.,NETt): correlation with respect to net employment
change.
Table 6: Sensitivity of cyclical properties to wu and wm
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Figure 2: Effect on the relative job destruction rate volatility of a firing tax 10% increase,
for different values of wm
∆corr(JTt,NETt)
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Figure 3: Effect on the job turnover cyclicality of a firing tax 10% increase, for different
values of wm
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Appendix
Optimality conditions
Household
The first order optimality conditions are:
UCt = βEt
[
(1 + rt+1)UCt+1
]
, (32)
DSSt = βptSStEt
[∫ +∞
R0
t+1
WHN0
t+1
(z)dF (z)
]
. (33)
UCt is the first derivative of U with respect to Ct, D
S
St
the first derivative of DS with respect
to search intensity St. The marginal contribution W
H
Njt
to household’s welfare of working on
a job of type j, is given by the envelope theorem:
WH
Njt
(x) = UCt(w
j
t (x) − w
u) +DS(St)−D
N
Njt
+
β(1 − ptS(St))Et
[∫ +∞
R1
t+1
WHN1
t+1
(z)dF (z)
]
,
(34)
where DN
Njt
is the first derivative of DN with respect to a job of type j.
Final firm
The first order optimality conditions can be written as follows:
FKt = rt + δ, (35)
FQt = dt. (36)
Wages properties
Using some arithmetic, we can derive several analytical properties. Firstly, it is easy to
check that without wage rigidity, i.e. when wm is not binding, the decision to stop a match
is jointly taken by the firm and the household. In other words:
if Qjt ≤ R
j
t then R
F,j
t = R
H,j
t = R
j
t .
On the other hand, if some wages are bounded downwards, the decision to stop a match is
always taken by the firm:
if Qjt > R
j
t then R
H,j
t = −∞ and R
F,j
t = R
j
t .
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Secondly, we have the following relationships between the reservation productivity Rjt , the
critical values Qjt and the bargained wages w
b,j
t (x), of the new jobs and the old jobs:
(R0t −R
1
t )dt = f, (37)
Q1t −R
1
t = Q
0
t −R
0
t , (38)
w
b,1
t (x) − w
b,0
t (x) = ηf. (39)
We obtain that the firing tax increases the difference both between the two job destruction
rates and the two wages. Moreover the distance between Rt and Qt is identical in new firms
and old firms.
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General cyclical properties
In the first columns of table 7, we report the cyclical properties of consumption, investment,
labor and output. We see that our model is able to reproduce stylized facts about the
behavior of these variables. We also do the same simulations than in the paper but with
fixed capital instead of variable capital (see last columns of table 7, and tables 8, 9, 10).
We see that introducing variable capital allows to better reproduce the cyclical properties
of consumption (consumption is much too volatile with fixed capital) and also allows to
magnify the effects of the shocks.
Ct It Nt Ft Ct It Nt Ft
Variable capital Fixed capital
AR(1) 0.77 0.81 0.90 0.79 0.78 - 0.90 0.78
σ 0.51 3.08 0.52 1 1.47 - 0.48 1
corr(.,Ft) 0.97 0.99 0.94 1 1 - 0.94 1
All series are HP filtered. AR(1): autocorrelation of order 1. σ: standard deviation. corr(.,Ft): correlation with
respect to output. It: investment.
Table 7: Cyclical properties in reference calibration
F JT U pop wm U duration w¯
benchmark 1.43 9.8% 10.5% 14.5% 2.4 1.03
wu (+10%) -1.1% +1.8 +2.4 -1.2 +6.7% +1.0%
wm (+10%) -2.2% +6.1 +5.9 +4.0 +2.8% +2.1%
pop wm: percentage of the workers paid at the lower bound wage. U duration: mean unemployment spell duration
(expressed in quarters). w¯: mean wage.
Table 8: Long run effects of institutional shocks (deviations from the benchmark) with fixed
capital
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JCt JDt JTt
AR(1) 0.87 0.69 0.89
σ 0.81 0.99 1.49
corr(.,NETt) 0.43 -0.67 -0.21
All series are HP filtered. AR(1): autocorrelation of order 1. σ: standard deviation. corr(.,NETt): correlation
with respect to net employment change.
Table 9: Cyclical properties of job flows in reference calibration, with fixed capital
wu = 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.48
σ(JDt)/σ(JCt) 1.23 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22
corr(JTt, NETt) -0.22 -0.22 -0.21 -0.21 -0.20
wm = 0.54 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.66
σ(JDt)/σ(JCt) 1.29 1.25 1.22 1.20 1.16
corr(JTt, NETt) -0.28 -0.24 -0.21 -0.18 -0.15
All series are HP filtered. σ: standard deviation. corr(.,NETt): correlation with respect to net employment
change.
Table 10: Sensitivity of cyclical properties to wu, wm and f , with fixed capital
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Results sensitivity to different calibrations for f
In figures 4, 5 and 6, we reproduce the effects on the unemployment rate and on the cyclical
properties of the job flows, of a 10% increase in wm, but for different values of f . We
see that, whatever the calibration of f , a rise in the minimum wage always increases the
unemployment rate and decreases the relative volatility of the job destruction rate.
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Figure 4: Effect on unemployment of a minimum wage 10% increase, for different values of
f
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Figure 5: Effect on the relative job destruction rate volatility of a minimum wage 10%
increase, for different values of f
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Figure 6: Effect on the job turnover cyclicality of a minimum wage 10% increase, for different
values of f
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